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little agreement. Some would restrict the definition to involve communication between people only, others ~ould in~lude machines and animals, and still others would include revelation as communication (Newman, 1960:61) .
For some, notably psychologists, communication is the response of an organism to a stimulus (IBID:60). Cherry (1957:7) objects to the latter, noting that it is not the response itself that is communication, but rather the relationship between the stimulus and the response. The latter seems to be what Weaver (1949:15) was saying when he noted that communication includes "all of the PROCEDURES by which one mind can affect anothe·r-." (italics mine) For purposes of this paper the theoretical discussion centered around the definition may be side-stepped for the most part and a definition accepted that focuses upon the process involved when one system, the source, influences another, the destination, by manipulation of signals. When models are discussed, the further distinction will be made between communication in general and human communi-c·ation.
COMMUNICATIONS MODELS
The minimal system of communication as outlined by Shannon and Weaver in 1949 in The itathea:atical Theory of Communication has been applied to the transmission of information in electrical, biological, psychological, social and linguistic systems. It is an explanation of communication in general involving an infonnation souTce (see figure 1) which selects a message and, by means of a transmitter, converts the message into a signal. The signal is then sent over a channel to a receiver which converts the signal back into the original message and sends it to the destination. The process by which message is converted into a signal is called encoding. The reverse process by which the signal is converted back into the message is referred to as decoding. The code, according to Berlo (1960:30) , is simply a systematic 108. set of symbols, or arbitrary relationships of form to meaning. Encoding, then becomes a matter of selecting the proper form to represent a given meanins. 1 It also involves relating these form-meaning composites to each other in a sequence according to prescribed rules (syntactic rules). The rules themselves convey meaning, so that the selection of the proper rule aids in getting a message across. For example, there is a syntactic rule in English that says the subject comes first in a declarative transitive clause, the verb next and the object last. Thus, to say 0 Bill hit it indicates that Bill (a form-meaning composite representing a male homo sapiens) is the actor. Gleason's description (1964:4) of language as a code having three kinds of components is useful here: inventories, sets of units out of which structures can be built; tactic rules, specification of ways in which units can be used to build structures; and recoding rules, specifications of the relations which obtain between co-occurrent superimposed structures.
In transmitting the signal over the channel certain variations in the signal not intended by the source occur; anything which causes these unintended variations is referred to as noise (Weaver, 1949:17) . sign~ receive! signal information source--ftransmitter-~channel~receiver~estination T noise source J FIGURE 1 (from Weaver, 1949) In communications theory the term information has a restric~ed meant·ng in that it is that which "P.rOV.~d.es the receiver with the ability to select from a bounded repertoire. Complete information would supply the minimal 109. coded instruction to allow the receiver to select uniquely and unambiguously, whereas redundant information would provide an excess of coded instructions for the same selection 01eier, 1962:125) . This principle of redundancy is very important to communication in that the more redundancy there is, the more tolerance there is for noise (Rapoport, 1953:51) . For example, I have often observed people listening to a radio while driving a tractor or boat or while pushing a lawnmower. Obviously these people miss many of the segmental phonemes uttered over the radio, but due to redundancy, or context, they are able to grasp the meaning or message of the radio program.
Shannon and Weaver's model is unilinear, consisting of a source and a destination, a beginning and an end. However, if the principle or feedback is added to this model, it becomes circular -i.e. messages received can affect messages sent. Just as redundancy is the repetition of a signal to overcome noise, negative feedback may be regarded as another error-correcting mechanism to overcome noise (Smith, 1966:365) . Assuming that noise alters the signal so that the intended message is not the message received, the response of the destination will be different than "7hat is expected II of it by the source. This unexpected response acts as negative feedback to the source, causing it to emit another message in an attempt to overcome the error (see Wiener, 1948) . If the etror is overcome and the destination responds as expected, this response acts es positive feedback to the source which may either send new messages or discontinue messages. Sebeok (1963:52) and Osgood and Sebeok (1965:1) cot.m1unication unit input~receiver-~>destination-;;,source--)-transmitter--}t)utput 111.
The main burden of most messages is this orientation toward the referenti.e. orienting the actor and addressee toward the referent in similar ways.
Put in the words of Berlo (1960:16) , the purpose of communication is the elicitation of a given response from a given person or group of personsthat is1, getting others to understand things as the sender understands them.
A,nother trait of the human model that must be accounted for, but is ignored.~y most, is the ability qf the receiver to tune in or drop outi.e •. to. shiftrJ!liS focus of attention, closing the channel a11d ending communication. Schramm (1963: 10) and rteier (1962.: 12) note that each of us is surrounded by many more messages than we can possibly receive.
Therefore, we must be selective; our choice of messages to be received is dependent upon availability of the mess.age and rewards promised by it.
If the message can be heard or seen at almost any time of day (eg.
advertising on radio, television or billboards) its likelihood of being received is great. Likewise if it is in line with our present interests, we are more likely to pay attention to it. This is the first hurdle in communication.
Once the message has gotten past this hurdle (i.e. selection) it must then be either accept~d or rejected. This process ls a matter of cogniti6n, which will be discussed at more length later.
In all of the above no mention has been made of the kinds of channels 
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IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS THEORY CROSS-CULTURALLY
It has been a recoghlZed fact in linguistics and anthropology ror at least half a century now that referential categories a're not universals, but take varied forms in different languages (cf. de Saussure:116). The problems being encountered in machine translation give ample eviBence to this fact. In discussing this, Nida (1964:53) and Campbell and Hepler (1965:89) cross-culturally, universally predictable, but emic phenomena mus~ be discovered in each culture -they have structure imputed to them by their users. In psychology, the difference between sensation and cognition is somewhat akin to the etic-emic distinction (cf. Witkin, et al, 1954 and Bruner, ~ al, 1966) . Etic phenomena are those which are received by a person simply through senaation; emic phenomena involve the meaningful categories into which the etic phenomena are placed by a member of a given culture. Etic phenomena are the areal world" but emic phenomena are .man's "created world". may have a number of actually discrete phenomena.
11.5'.
Out of this type of view the approach known as "ethnoscience" or 11 fnrmaJ semantics" came into being. The general purpose of ethnoscience is to discover the cognitive organization shared by individuals in a given culture -to discover the culturally-dete~ined ways in which individuals define and categorize experience. Various methodologtes are b•tng used to discover these underlying emic slassifications of phenomena, the most popular of which is componential analysis, developed from linguistic distinctive feature analysis by Goodenough (1961) .
Although not generally identified with ethnoscience approach, the semantic differential as developed by Osgood (1962) is also an attempt to determine cognitive organization in various cultures.
What is the relevance of all of this to communication in the contact situation? Foster (1962:134) notes, as do many £~thors, that to the extent that language and culture are tha same for two individuals, communication is relatively easy. But the more diversity that exists in either of these categories, the more difficulty there is in communicating.
The raason for this, of course, is that when the source and the receiver are utilizing the same code in interpreting messages, there is little change in the meaning of the message. However, as the codes become increasingly diverse, the ability for both to interpret messages similarly decreases. Goodenough (1963; 147) defines cognitive organization as including "the ways in which the phenomena we discern appear to us to be mutually associated or arranged, and it includes the transformations from one to another perceptual category that phenomena appear to undergo as their mutual associatiA>ns change." Individuals who share a common set of relations as well as signs are said to have cognitive symJDetry. or 116.
co-orientation (Newcomb, 1953:69) . The implications of this for culture change are twofold. First, for anyone to invent anything new or to accept a nel~ invention, he must organize existing concepts of reality into new relationships (Hagen, 1962:87; Goodenough, 1963:149) . Second, since all change must be somewhat consistent with existing cognitive orientations, introduced ideas or traits will be perceived and interpreted in light of existing meaning patterns. This, of course, gives rise to the phenomenon of syncretism. Foster (1962:27) notes that the more susceptible a given innovation is to reinterpretation in terms of the existing conceptual framework, the more likely it is to be accepted. Consequently, if syncretism is not desired, the new technique ~r idea must be presented in a way that the recipient penceives its potential advantages in much the same way as the innovator does (Foster:120) .
It is at this point that ethnoscience might be of some value, because it deals with the implicit associations surrounding ideas, and it is only if the change agent is aware of the connotations and associated values of a given idea that he can expect to predict possible reactions 4 to its introduction. By doing a detailed and complete analysis of the taxonomies associated with the new trait, the agent should gain insight into the recipient's code the way the recipient uses it, thus avoiding the fatal mistake of using his own perceptual grid to filter the concepts of the recipient.
THE GEHERAL SYSTm•lS APPROACH
At this point I would like to use the general systems approach to the contact situation. The model to be followed is the ~asic mo<J.,el presented by Shannon and Weaver described above. The basic intePp:te·cations are fairly obvious. The source, of course, 111ay be either of the cwo 117.
cultures in contact, but I will refer to the source here as the contacting society, and to the destination as the contacted society since that generally seems to be the case today. The message to be transmitted deals with the introduction of an innovation, either ideological or technological. In most cases the transmitter is a professional agent, such as an agronomist, who is a member of the contacting society and must first decode the message from his own coding system and then encode it into the coding system of the recipient culture. In so doing he is bound to introduce 11 semantic noise", which Weav.er defines as any distortion of meamng unintentionally introduced by the source (1949:23) . Since the agent is functioning as transmitter, converting a message into a code that he is not entirely familiar with, he will undoubtedly transmit some signals whose meaning is a little different than what he perceives it to be.
Another type of semantic noise that might conceivably be introduced is the sending of conflicting messages over different channels (eg. saying one thing and unconsciously contnadicting it with behavior that means something else or indicates that he is not serious -that is. by contradicting himself on a paralinguistic or kinesic channel). Similar to this problem is the problem of what many communications theorists refer to as csurface meaning 11 and latent meaning" (Schramm, 1963:9) . The surface meaning of a message is that meaning taken directly from a spoken utterance whereas latent meaning is that meaning abstracted from the context of the relationship of sender and receiveT. For example, to say ''Good morning' does not necessarily mean that the weather is good. To interpret it this way is to utilize only surface meaning, but to interpret it as meaning "Hello 01 Glad to see you is to utU.ize latent meaning. Frozen collocations, or idioms, are actually examples of this type of phenomenon.
Closely related is the matter of primary chanttel. It is often t'tue that the choice of channels is an important factor in making a message effective (Berlo, 1960:31) . Therefore, the change agent must ask him- 119.
It would be helpful to go through the entire matrix noting whether each cell represents the attitude of deference, equality or superiority. Although
this cannot be applied to all cells, it should be helpful in giving insights in those to which it can be applied.
When the responses of the contacted society are not what were expected in a given situation, the agent will utilize this negative feedback and compensate in future transmissions. The longer the contact and the more feedback the agent gets, the more information he receives regarding the receiver's conception of the innovation. A classic case of the utilization of feedback in a change program is the Vicos project described by Holmberg (1960) .
Niehoff (1966) recognizes the importance of both watching for and utilizing feedback in directed change.
In some situations of mediated contact the transmitter to the contacted society is a member of that society. Consequently, he will interpret the contact situation iu te~s of his own cognitive structurine and then transmit this version on to the recipient culture. If he has received his concept of the situation from a member of the CQntacting society rather than through direct experience, the original 1ouree message has the chance of being altered twice. In addition, he may choose ta ignore certain features or to transmit
only part Qf what he ha$ received. A special problem arises when the receiver himself introduces semantic noise (eg. the mediator may be psychologically aaerrant, ~:rill decode messages in unusual ways and then transmit these).
A model devised by Westley and Maclean (1957:83) to account for mediation 1$ quite applicable here in that Lt s1,111111la~izes the possible relationshj.ps spoken of so far ( Figure 5 ). or it might be a committee or agency such as a health clinic. A could be an entire social system (as when two small groups come into contact in a migration), or it too could be an agr;ncy interpreting a contacting culture's content to the contacced culture.
Westley and MacLean are also the only ones encountered in the research for this paper who include non-puq,osive (non-directed) change along with purposive change in their -communications model. As they put it "A purpose message is one A originates for the purpose of modifying B's perception of an x. A non-pur-posive merssage is one which is transmitted to B directly or by means of a C and in the absence of any communicator's intent to influence him. The absence of a Communicator's intent to influence B transforms his act into an x. When a person says something he hopes will reach anoth~ person's ears, he is an A; but if he says it without such intent and it nevertheless is trans1111tted to B, his act must be conceived of as an x.'' tp. 84). This may be directly translated into a cross-ctt1-tu~al situation of non-<lir~cted ehange as proposed by Spicer (19:S20ff.) .
In all contact situa~iona the nature of the contact as it is perceived by the !ndivid~al may be a source of noise. Knowing the cultural code of the receiver may not be -enough, for the cont-act itself may influence the message a~ per-cei'7ed by the receiver. Reference here is to a typology 12·2=. of contact situations as proposed by such as Smith and Dohrenwend (1962) and Spicer (1961) Tnis is auequately expressed in the stratificational theory of language espoused by Gleason and Laml.i among ot11ei:s. dere, the form-meaning composite is a morpheme and the underlying unit behind the morpheme is a seme1ae -an abstraction from the tangled mess of reality (see Gleason, 1964:3) . Since it lies outside tile scope of tltL,s paper, the debate over the necessary correlation of perception and cognition will not Le discussea here. Also, the problem .of. wt1ether elid.cizi-ng involves learning dist·inc-ions on a hign level of abstractiou or ,ihether it involves 'unlearning' already-perceived distinct-ions will be left to the psychologists ana linguists. I suspect taat botu 4 At this point :LIJ. its dei.V~l"opmenii, componential analysis will be of lil.ldteci help though, because as currently (1968) employed, it is restricted to signiftcation as o,pposeu to connotation.
That is, it maps only the distinctive features of an iuea, not all possible associations. It also tends to deal P.nly with syste'llat,ic contras-ts and to ignore gradient differences.
